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“SAUVÉ AND
PRISONERS’ VOTING
RIGHTS: THE DEATH OF
THE GOOD CITIZEN?”
David M. Brown*

I.

INTRODUCTION

“If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again:” traditional folk wisdom that
Parliament applied with great success throughout the 1990’s.1 Parliament
avoided the majority ruling in O’Connor2 by legislatively co-opting the
minority’s reasons, which the Court duly upheld in Mills;3 so too the result in
Seaboyer4 was reversed by legislation subsequently upheld in Darrach.5 So
when, in 1993, the Supreme Court released its cryptic, 100-odd word decision
in Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General)6 striking down section 51(e) of the
Canada Elections Act7 which disqualified from voting in federal elections
“every person undergoing punishment as an inmate in any penal institution for
* Partner, Stikeman Elliott LLP (Toronto). I am indebted to the excellent research conducted
by two of our articling students, Jessica Bookman and Owen M. Rees, without whose efforts this
paper would not have been possible. I also wish to thank David Frayer, Q.C. and Gérald L. Chartier
of the Department of Justice, Winnipeg, who kindly allowed me to review the record filed before
the Supreme Court of Canada, and Iain Benson and Brad Miller for their comments on earlier drafts
of this paper.
1
The majority in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66 offers a
contrarian view of judicial history: “The healthy and important promotion of a dialogue between
the legislature and the courts should not be debased to a rule of ‘if at first you don’t succeed, try,
try, again.’ ” Sauvé, at para. 17. Tellingly, the majority avoids any reference to Mills or Darrach.
2
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
3
R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
4
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
5
R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443. Generally, see the discussion in Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2001), at 161-69 and 191-98.
6
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.
7
R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 [hereinafter “the CEA”].
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the commission of any offence” on the basis that the section was “drawn too
broadly and fails to meet the proportionality test, particularly the minimal
impairment component of the test,” 8 Parliament duly enacted a new section
narrowing the electoral restriction to persons “imprisoned in a correctional
institution serving a sentence of two or more years,” 9 and then, no doubt, sat
back thinking that the Supreme Court would congratulate it for having engaged
in such constructive “dialogue” with the Court.
Parliament was wrong. In a 5-4 decision released in October, 2002, the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down the narrowed prisoner voting restriction
in section 51(e) of the CEA and, in the process, elevated the democratic right to
vote guaranteed by section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms10
to the status of a virtually absolute right, incapable of a justifiable infringement
under section 1 of the Charter.
Professor Haigh, in his intriguing paper, “Between Here and There is Better
than Anything Over There: The Morass of Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer),”11 probes several aspects of the Sauvé decision: the element of judicial
rhetoric; the case as an example of the “dialogue” between the courts and the
legislatures; the public perception of the case; and, the nature of voting in the
21st century. While I wish to engage Professor Haigh on his discussion of the
moral dimension of the decision, I will focus on some other dimensions of the
Sauvé case: (i) the impact on the section 1 analysis of the Court’s failure to
explore the links between the two elements of section 3 — the right to vote and
the right to be qualified for legislative office; (ii) the debate within the Court
about the appropriate source from which to frame a section 1 analysis, and the
associated dispute over the constitutional legitimacy of symbolic or abstract
legislative objectives; (iii) the majority’s apparent rejection of the concept of
citizen obligation under social contract political theory — have we seen the
“death of the good citizen”?; and, (iv) the use, and misuse, of political
philosophy by the Court in the Sauvé case and more generally.

8

Supra, note 6, at 439-40.
Supra, note 7, at s. 5.51(e).
10
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
11
(2003), 2002 Constitutional Cases: Sixth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada.
9
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THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND THE RIGHT TO STAND FOR OFFICE:
FLIP-SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?

Section 3 of the Charter guarantees two rights to every citizen of Canada: the
right to vote in a federal and provincial election, and the right “to be qualified
for membership” in the House of Commons or a provincial assembly. In
conducting its purposive analysis of section 3 the majority in Sauvé focused
only on the right to vote; it treated the right to be qualified for office as a
distinct, unrelated right. This was unfortunate and probably influenced the
section 1 analysis engaged in by the majority. For while the majority described
the right to vote in almost absolute terms, at the end of her judgment the Chief
Justice acknowledged that Parliament might be justified in limiting the right to
be qualified for office contained in the second half of section 3:
I leave for another day whether some political activities, like standing for office,
could be justifiably denied to prisoners under s. 1. It may be that practical problems
might serve to justify some limitations on the exercise of derivative democratic
rights. Democratic participation is not only a matter of theory but also of practice,
and legislatures retain the power to limit the modalities of its exercise where this
can be justified. Suffice it to say that the wholesale disenfranchisement of all
penitentiary inmates, even with a two-year minimum sentence requirement, is not
demonstrably justified in our free and democratic society.12

Six years earlier, in the Harvey case, the Court appeared to accept that an
infringement of either part of section 3 potentially could be justified under
section 1 of the Charter.13 It therefore seems odd that in Sauvé the majority
adopted an interpretive approach to a section of the Charter that would result in
one part of the right contained in the section being virtually immune from
infringement, while leaving the door open to limitations on the second part of
the right.
Sauvé leaves unanswered the question as to what would have resulted from a
purposive analysis which took into account both parts of section 3. Would a
court conclude that both parts of section 3 advance and protect the same, or
different, interests? What impact would such an analysis play on any resulting
section 1 analysis of section 51(e) of the CEA? Unfortunately the Crown’s
12
13

Sauvé, supra, note 1, para. 62 (emphasis added).
Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876, per La Forest, J. at pa-

ra. 30:
In interpreting the right to vote under s. 3 this Court, and Canadian courts in general,
have taken the approach that the justification for limitations on the right must be grounded
in s. 1 of the Charter. As I have earlier noted, I do not believe the wording in the second part
of s. 3 justifies taking a different approach to the right to stand for election and become a
member of Parliament or a legislative assembly.
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concession in the case of a section 3 infringement forestalled such a purposive
analysis, a concession duly criticized by the minority because of the limits it
placed on the interpretation of the right in question:
I would like to sound a cautionary note regarding the appropriateness of
concessions of infringement. The specific problem with such a concession is that it
may deprive the courts of the benefit of the fruitful argument which most often
occurs at that initial phase of the analysis, in defining the scope of the right,
particularly with regard to historical and philosophical context. The development of
contextual factors examined with regard to the scope of the right is of great
importance since they clearly “animate” the later stages of the test elaborated in R.
v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103: see McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Reference re
Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (“Saskatchewan
Reference”), at p. 182.14

The utility that a more fulsome argument on the meaning of the rights and
interests protected by section 3 found expression in several questions posed, but
not answered, by Gonthier, J. who authored the minority decision: must a
prisoner have the right to stand as a candidate? If an incarcerated offender were
to be elected, would he or she have a right to be released from prison to take up
that representative role?15 Answers to those questions could assist in bringing a
more robust contextual approach to any section 1 analysis of a limitation on the
right to vote. It is worth turning briefly to those unanswered questions and
exploring whether any historical link existed between the right to vote and the
eligibility for office.
Prisoner disenfranchisement has long roots in Canada. 16 The Constitution
Act, 1791,17 which established Upper and Lower Canada, specifically provided
in section 23 for prisoner disenfranchisement: “no Person shall be capable of
voting at any Election of a Member to serve in such Assembly, in either of the
said provinces … who shall have been attained for Treason or Felony in any
Court of Law within any of His Majesty’s Dominions …” . Section 41 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 preserved the status quo and authorized Parliament to
establish the qualifications for membership in the House of Commons and for
voters at elections.18
14

Sauvé, supra, note 1, at para. 78.
Sauvé, supra, note 1, at para. 88.
16
See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Sauvé (No. 2) (1999), 180 D.L.R. (4th) 385,
for the detailed history of the limitations.
17
(1791), 31 Geo. 111, c. 31.
18
Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, all Laws in force in the several
Provinces at the Union relative to the following Matters or any of them, namely, — the
Qualifications and Disqualifications of Persons to be elected or to sit or vote as Members of
the House of Assembly or Legislative Assembly in the several Provinces, the Voters at
15
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Although the first federal electoral law, the 1885 Electoral Franchise Act,
made no specific reference to prisoner disenfranchisement, subsection 3(1) of
that Act required that voters be “of the full age of twenty-one years, and … not
by this Act or any law of the Dominion of Canada, disqualified or prevented
from voting.”19 Justice Linden, writing for the majority of the Federal Court of
Appeal in the Sauvé case, thought that the voter disqualification contained in
the Constitution Act of 1791 and preserved by section 41 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, likely was the law in force in 1885. Then, in 1898, the Franchise Act
enacted a limitation that denied the vote in federal elections to “[a]ny person
who, at the time of an election, is a prisoner in a jail or prison undergoing
punishment for a criminal offence.” 20 The restriction remained virtually
unchanged until it was struck down by the Supreme Court in Sauvé v. Canada
(Attorney General),21 and subsequently replaced with a restriction that applied
only to those incarcerated serving a sentence for two or more years.
Turning to the eligibility to stand for election, the CEA historically linked
one’s eligibility to vote in an election with the qualification to stand for election
as a candidate. Prior to the passage of a new CEA in 2000, section 77(h) of the
CEA provided that certain classes of persons were not eligible to stand as
candidates at an election including “every person who is declared by section 51
to be not qualified to vote, during the time that pursuant to that section he is not
qualified to vote.”22 Since section 51(e) of the CEA disqualified from voting
prisoners serving a sentence of two or more years, the voting disqualification
prevented a prisoner from running as a candidate in a federal election. This
linkage was carried into the 2000 CEA.23
As observed by the Court in the Reference Re Provincial Electoral
Boundaries (Sask.) case, the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in section 3
of the Charter is “effective representation,” which comprehends “the idea of
having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea of the

Elections of such Members, the Oaths to be taken by Voters, the Returning Officers, their
Powers and Duties, the Proceedings at Elections, the Periods during which Elections may be
continued, the Trial of controverted Elections, and Proceedings incident thereto, the vacating of Seats of Members, and the Execution of new Writs in case of Seats vacated otherwise
than by Dissolution, — shall respectively apply to Elections of Members to serve in the
House of Commons for the same several Provinces …
19
S.C. 1885, c. 40.
20
S.C. 1898, c. 14, s. 6(4).
21
Supra, note 6.
22
R.S.C. 1985, c. E-1, s. 77(h).
23
S.C. 2000, c. 9. Section 750(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, also contains a
disability from election to Parliament or a legislature for any person holding “an office under the
Crown or other public employment” who is convicted of an indictable offence for which the person
is sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more.
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right to bring one’s grievances and concerns to the attention of one’s government
representative …”24 Would allowing a prisoner to stand for electoral office
impair the right of a voter to effective representation? The difficulty that an
incarcerated member of Parliament would face in fulfilling crucial functions,
including the member’s representative function, was recognized by the Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (the “Lortie
Commission”) which recommended that “any prisoner who is serving a
sentence that includes the period from nomination day to election day be
ineligible to be a candidate” and that any member of Parliament sentenced to
prison for six months or more resign his or her seat. 25
The Lortie Commission’s recommendation reflects a long-standing
Parliamentary tradition. While the Parliament of Canada Act does not contain
an express power of the House to expel a member who is convicted of a general
criminal offence,26 it is well settled that the House of Commons enjoys the
inherent power to expel a member for such reasons as it sees fit, including
conviction for a criminal offence. Maingot cites English parliamentary
precedent for the proposition that once elected, the jurisdiction of the House
over its members, including the right to discipline within its own walls, is
“absolute and exclusive.”27 The Court has found that the inherent privilege of a
legislative assembly to exclude strangers enjoys constitutional status as part of
the Constitution of Canada and cannot be abrogated by another part of the
Constitution, including the Charter.28 No doubt the same would apply to the
inherent power of the House of Commons to expel a member convicted of a
crime, although whether a statutory power to expel would stand in the same
position remains an open question.29
None of this was considered by the Sauvé court in conducting its purposive
analysis of the right to vote in section 3. Whether the interests protected by the
24

[1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at para. 49, per McLachlin J.
Final Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Vol. 1
(Ottawa: The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, 1991), at 84-86.
26
Section 41 of the Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-1 does make it an offence
for a member of the House of Commons to receive any compensation for services rendered in
relation to any bill or other matter before the House, and on conviction the member becomes
disqualified to sit in the House for five years.
27
Maingot, Parliamentary Privilege in Canada (2d ed., 1997), at 187-90. See also Fraser et
al., Beauchesne’s Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, (6th ed., 1989), at 16-17.
See also the extensive discussion of the issue in the concurring judgment of McLachlin J. in Harvey, supra, note 13, at paras. 61-88.
28
New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 319.
29
See the debate contained in La Forest, J.’s majority opinion in Harvey, supra, note 13, at
para. 20, and the concurring opinion of McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ., at paras. 55 and 56.
25
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right to vote are the same as, or may be influenced by, the interests
underpinning the right to stand for election remains unanswered by the Court.
A section 1 analysis requires the fullest possible understanding of the interests
protected by the right in order to assess the reasonableness of any legislative
limit. In Sauvé the Court not only side-stepped such a holistic purposive
analysis, but it effectively forestalled any future consideration of the
reasonableness of statutory limits on the right to stand for election. By striking
down the electoral restriction on prisoners in section 51(e) of the CEA, the
Court made prisoners eligible to run for Parliamentary office without any
discussion of the implications of such a result. This indirect consequence of the
Sauvé case could lead to an unanticipated constitutional “Catch-22.” Sauvé has
removed the statutory bar to prisoners being qualified to stand for election; a
prisoner can now run for office and be elected. Yet traditional parliamentary
privilege (that the Charter likely cannot abrogate) would enable Parliament to
expel a member convicted of a crime. Who would prevail? The Supreme Court
à la Sauvé, or Parliament resting on its privilege? All of which points to the
dangers of a court proceeding to interpret only part of the constitutional text at
a time, without considering the interplay between the various interests protected
by a section of the Charter.

III. THE DISPUTE OVER THE STANDARD OF JUSTIFICATION
At the heart of the difference between the majority and minority decisions in
Sauvé, and partially obscured by the rhetoric surrounding the issue of judicial
deference to the legislatures, lies an important debate about how to conduct a
section 1 analysis. Two issues are engaged: (i) what is the controlling test —
the language of section 1 or judicial glosses on the Oakes test? and (ii) what
kinds of legislative objectives can survive judicial scrutiny under section 1 of
the Charter.
1. The Text of Section 1 or a Glossed Oakes?
On the surface, both sides appeared to start their section 1 analysis from the
same point. The Chief Justice wrote that “Parliament cannot use lofty
objectives to shield legislation from Charter scrutiny.” 30 The minority agreed
that section 51(e) of the CEA must be justified under section 1. The Chief
Justice stated that any limits on rights require “careful examination” with any
justification “supported by logic and common sense.” 31 Justification need not
30
31

Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 16.
Id., at para. 9.
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be to the standard of empirical or mathematical precision, she wrote, but is
sufficient if it is “convincing, in the sense that it is sufficient to satisfy the
reasonable person looking at all the evidence and relevant considerations”; 32
Gonthier J. specifically agreed with this statement. 33
At this point, however, the consensus broke down, and the disagreement, in
my view, results from differing views about the role of the text of the
Constitution in constitutional analysis. Although it may seem trite, it is worth
recalling that the text of the Charter sets out the test by which the government
may justify laws that infringe guaranteed rights. Section 1 reads:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The constitutional text therefore permits limits that are (i) reasonable, (ii)
prescribed by law, and (iii) demonstrably justifiable (iv) in a free and democratic
society. In Oakes34 the Court interpreted the constitutional text and formulated a
two-part test requiring demonstration, on a civil balance of proof, that the
legislation (i) addressed a “pressing and substantial” objective and (ii) displayed a
proportionality between its means and ends. Inevitably, when conducting section 1
analysis, courts began to neglect the actual language of section 1 and, instead,
applied the language of the Oakes test, effectively substituting the judicial
language in Oakes for the text of the Constitution. It is true that periodically the
Supreme Court has reminded lower courts that the Oakes test is merely a set of
“guidelines” to consider when applying section 1, and that the appropriate test in
a section 1 analysis is that found in the section itself.35 However, the Court often
seems to forget its own advice and continues to rely on the Oakes test in virtual
substitution for the constitutional text.
Contrast the consequences in Sauvé between the minority’s textual approach
to section 1 and the majority’s reliance on Oakes. Justice Gonthier, for the
minority, stressed that section 1 did not require legislatures to design a “perfect
solution,” but to ascertain whether “Parliament, in its attempt to reconcile
competing interests, has achieved a rational and reasonable balance.” 36 In
critiquing the majority’s section 1 approach, Gonthier, J. emphasized the need
for attention to the language of section 1 itself:
This case rests on philosophical, political and social considerations which are not
capable of “scientific proof”. It involves justifications for and against the limitation
32
33
34
35
36

Id., at para. 18.
Id., at para. 94.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 138-40.
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 126.
Sauvé, supra, note 30, at para. 91.

Job name: SCLR vol 20

CRA

Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012

(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Sauvé and Prisoner’s Voting Rights

305

of the right to vote which are based upon axiomatic arguments of principle or value
statements. I am of the view that when faced with such justifications, this Court
ought to turn to the text of s. 1 of the Charter and to the basic principles which
undergird both s. 1 and the relationship that provision has with the rights and
freedoms protected within the Charter. Particularly, s. 1 of the Charter requires
that this Court look to the fact that there may be different social or political
philosophies upon which justifications for or against the limitations of rights may
be based. In such a context, where this Court is presented with competing social or
political philosophies relating to the right to vote, it is not by merely approving or
preferring one that the other is necessarily disproved or shown not to survive
Charter scrutiny. If the social or political philosophy advanced by Parliament
reasonably justifies a limitation of the right in the context of a free and democratic
society, then it ought to be upheld as constitutional. I conclude that this is so in the
case at bar.37

Relying on the language of section 1, Gonthier J. then develops the theme
that the Charter does not limit legislatures to infringing rights only for a single
“right reason,” but permits limitations for a variety of reasons as long as they
fall within reasonable confines recognizable as a “free and democratic society.”
A pluralism of legislative responses, based on a return to the plain language of
section 1, echoes throughout the following passage in Gonthier’s decision:
There is a flaw in an analysis which suggests that because one social or political
philosophy can be justified, it necessarily means that another social or political
philosophy is not justified: in other words, where two social or political
philosophies exist, it is not by approving one that you disprove the other.
Differences in social or political philosophy, which result in different justifications
for limitations upon rights, are perhaps inevitable in a pluralist society. That
having been said, it is only those limitations that are not reasonable or
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society which are unconstitutional.
Therefore, the most significant analysis in this case is the examination of the social
or political philosophy underpinning the justification advanced by the Crown. This
is because it will indicate whether the limitation of the right to vote is reasonable
37

Sauvé, id., at para. 67 (emphasis added). Justice Gonthier continued in para. 95:
The reasons of the Chief Justice apply something seemingly more onerous than the
“justification” standard referred to just above. She describes the right to vote as a “core
democratic right” and suggests that its exemption from the s. 33 override somehow raises
the bar for the government in attempting to justify its restriction (paras. 13 and 14). This altering of the justification standard is problematic in that it seems to be based upon the view
that there is only one plausible social or political philosophy upon which to ground a justification for or against the limitation of the right. This approach, however, is incorrect on a
basic reading of s. 1 of the Charter, which clearly does not constrain Parliament or authorize this Court to prioritize one reasonable social or political philosophy over reasonable
others, but only empowers this Court to strike down those limitations which are not reasonable and which cannot be justified in a free and democratic society.
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and is based upon a justification that is capable of being demonstrated in a free and
democratic society. If the choice made by Parliament is such, then it ought to be
respected. The range of choices made by different legislatures in different
jurisdictions, which I will review below, supports the view that there are many
resolutions to the particular issue at bar which are reasonable; it demonstrates that
there are many possible rational balances.38

“Let a hundred flowers blossom; let a hundred schools of thought
contend!”39
Justice Gonthier emerges as a pluralist: “The Charter was not intended to
monopolize the ideological space.”40 Instead, it leaves room for competing
social and political philosophies, with the proper role of the court, in the eyes of
the minority, serving to define “the parameters within which the acceptable
reconciliation of competing values lies.”41 The Chief Justice criticizes the
minority for showing an unwarranted deference to Parliament, but I think the
criticism misses the mark. Gonthier’s analysis does not excuse the government
from justifying an infringement, but it reminds courts that the constitutional
obligation on the government is to satisfy the requirements of the language of
section 1 and not some other standard erected by the Court.
The majority take a completely different approach to section 1, starting with
the elevation of the right to vote in section 3 into the pantheon of virtually
untouchable rights. Engaging in its own textual analysis, the majority
concluded that the “framers of the Charter signalled the special importance of
this right not only by its broad, untrammelled language, but by exempting it
from legislative override under section 33’s notwithstanding clause.” 42 Later the
Chief Justice describes the right to vote as “one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Charter,”43 and then appears to suggest that no infringement
of the right is possible under section 1, stating that the ambit of the right
38

Sauvé, supra, note 30, at para. 97 (emphasis added).
Mao Ze-dong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” (1957), as
quoted in Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Praeyer Publishers, 1972), at 308.
40
Sauvé, supra, note 30, at para. 96.
41
Sauvé, supra, note 30, at para. 98 (emphasis in original). See further, id., at para 98, “The
decision before this Court is therefore not whether or not Parliament has made a proper policy
decision, but whether or not the policy position chosen is an acceptable choice amongst those
permitted under the Charter.”
42
The majority’s level of rhetoric surrounding s. 3 reaches some lofty heights: “Denial of the
right to vote to penitentiary inmates undermines the legitimacy of government, the effectiveness of
government, and the rule of law”: Sauvé, id., at para. 58. Given that legislative restrictions on
prisoners’ rights to vote have existed in Canada in some form or the other since 1791, that would
add up to 200 years of undermined and ineffective government!
43
Id., at para. 13
39
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“should not be limited by countervailing collective concerns, as the government
appears to argue.”44 Given that the government conceded that section 51(e) of
the CAE infringed section 3 of the Charter, it appears that the Chief Justice is
arguing that the nature of a right will influence the degree of scrutiny given to
any infringing legislation under section 1. In other words, some rights enjoy
greater protection from infringement than others. It is difficult to reconcile this
position with the oft-repeated view of the Court that there is no hierarchy of
rights under the Charter. Yet, the majority in Sauvé certainly is suggesting that
that is precisely the case when it comes to the ability to justify legislation under
section 1 of the Charter.
The majority then moves to a classic Oakes analysis. While characterizing
the government’s symbolic objectives as “problematically vague,” the majority
reluctantly accepted them as satisfying the first branch of Oakes.45 However, the
abstract nature of the government’s objectives proved their fatal flaw under the
majority’s proportionality analysis, for the “rhetorical nature of the government
objectives … renders them suspect”46 and the fundamental nature of voting rights
requires that the court apply “a stringent justification standard.”47
Sauvé offers two competing views about the requirements to justify
legislation infringing Charter rights. Resting its position on the text of section
1, the minority acknowledges the possibility of a plurality of legitimate policy
choices by legislatures, and looks to gauge their reasonableness within the
parameters of free and democratic societies. The majority stands on Oakes, and
adds yet a new gloss to the test that “suspect” infringements attract “stringent
justification standards.”48 With the battle lines drawn as they were, the differing
results, and the levels of rhetoric that accompanied them, come as no surprise.
Yet, stepping back from the fray, one might ask why the issue of limiting the
right to vote of convicted criminals while in a federal penitentiary evoked such
heated division? Prisoner disenfranchisement hardly qualifies as the kind of
political issue on which governments would rise or fall; and the practices in
other free and democratic countries49 reveal that a wide variety of legislative
approaches are taken to the issue of prisoners’ voting rights ranging from a
complete denial of the right to vote to those convicted of a criminal offence to
no denial of the franchise even while in prison, with section 51(e) of the CEA
falling, in good Canadian fashion, somewhere in the middle. Why, then, the
battle royale?
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id., at para. 11.
Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 24.
Id., at para. 14.
Id., at paras. 14 and 24.
Id., at paras. 122–34.
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Perhaps one should view the differences within the Court as one further
manifestation of the Court’s ongoing struggle to reconcile its powers of judicial
review with the principles of representative government. 50 The majority seem
sure of the primacy of the court, while the minority, reflecting on the text of the
Charter, appear less certain. Consider, for example, the stark contrast between
the majority and minority’s use of evidence of the practices in other
jurisdictions regarding prisoner disenfranchisement. No reference was made by
the majority to the practices of other “free and democratic societies,” while the
minority reviewed the practices at some length. 51 In so doing, is the majority
suggesting that the “free and democratic society” referred to in section 1 need
not be informed by the reasonable range of legislative practices outside Canada,
but requires only a “made-in-Canada” solution? Yet, if the government cannot
attempt to point to standards outside of Canada as an aid to measuring the
reasonableness of its limitation, to what standards can it point? Is the majority
suggesting that it alone creates the standards of reasonableness by which to
measure legislation? The very language of section 1 would seem to call the
court to consider any legislative restriction in the larger context of free and
democratic societies; but a “stringent” application of Oakes, such as in Sauvé,
pushes the justificatory analysis in a much more parochial and insular direction.
Instead of a broad inquiry into the practices in free and democratic societies
everywhere, the court attempts to craft a uniquely Canadian vision of what “this
free and democratic society” should look like.52 If the vision of what constitutes
50

Professor Weinrib develops this theme, albeit in a different direction, in her essay “The
Charter’s First Twenty Years: Assessing the Impact and Anticipating the Future,” presented at the
2002 Isaac Pitblado Lectures, Winnipeg, November, 2002.
51
Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at paras. 122-34.
52
This parochial approach finds expression in another context in the majority decision in
Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24 a case involving the constitutionality of preferences granted
to Canadian citizens in certain stages of hiring for the federal civil service. Although ample evidence was placed before the court about the prevalence of civil service hiring preferences in other
countries, in a remarkable passage the court discounted the utility of considering such practices
when determining whether a state practice might demean a person’s dignity: “One must never lose
sight of the overarching question, which is whether the law perpetuates the view that non-citizens
are less capable or less worthy of recognition or value as human beings or as members of Canadian
society; see Law, supra, at para. 99. It may be, in light of the above discussion, that a law defining
the core rights and privileges of citizens is incapable of perpetuating such a view; indeed, such a
law finds support in numerous international treaties and is accepted by almost every country in the
world. In my view, however, this misses the point of the Law methodology; what is required is a
contextualized look at how a non-citizen legitimately feels when confronted by a particular enactment.” (id., at para. 46) The message? The reasonable preferences employed by other free and
democratic societies must yield to the uniquely Canadian Law analysis which is based on feelings.
In fairness to the majority in Lavoie, the evidence of international practice did support a conclusion
that the preference was rationally connected to the legislative objective.
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a “free and democratic” society rests alone in the hands of the judges, then
reference to any range of legislative practices becomes unnecessary, a position
towards which the majority judgment in Sauvé seems inclined. In his judgment,
Gonthier, J. ventured that “the Charter was not intended to monopolize the
ideological space”; one could equally say that the language of section 1 of the
Charter sought to ensure that the courts would not monopolize the ideological
space by allowing for a pluralism of justifications, bounded only by the
parameters of “reasonable” limits in a “free and democratic society.” 53
2. The Role of Abstract Values under Section 1: In or Out?
Sauvé engages another aspect of the issue of who should shape the vision of
Canadian society by debating the constitutional legitimacy of Parliament
pursuing abstract or symbolic legislative objectives. Before looking at the
competing views expressed by the Court in Sauvé, it is worth reviewing the
various legislative objectives advanced by the government in previous cases to
justify limits on the prisoner franchise and how those objectives fared at the
hands of the courts. Since the Reynolds54 case in 1982, courts have considered
four objectives tendered by the government to justify denying criminals or
prisoners the right to vote: (i) the administrative and security difficulties in
arranging for voting in prisons; (ii) to affirm and maintain the sanctity of the
franchise in Canadian democracy by excluding from the political community
those who have disregarded its laws; (iii) to preserve the integrity of the voting
process; and (iv) to sanction offenders.55
In early prisoner voting cases in the 1980s Canadian courts largely rejected
administrative and security concerns as a valid objective for section 1 purposes,
leading the government to abandon advancing that objective in the cases heard
during the 1990s. Preservation of the integrity of the voting process and the
sanctioning of offenders fared little better. The real division of judicial opinion
has arisen over the second objective, the affirmation and maintenance of the
sanctity of the franchise in a democracy. In the 1984 British Columbia Court of
Appeal decision in Reynolds, Craig J., in his dissent, reasoned that society
could deprive a criminal of the civic right to vote because each citizen bears the

53
Justice Gonthier says as much in supra, note 51, at para. 104: “… the heart of the dialogue
metaphor is that neither the courts nor Parliament hold a monopoly on the determination of values.”
54
Re Reynolds and Attorney-General of British Columbia (1982), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 365
(B.C.S.C.).
55
Appendix “A” summarizes how courts have treated these objectives in the various prisoner
voting cases that have been decided since the enactment of the Charter.
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obligation to obey the law, a duty breached by committing a crime. 56 Four years
later in Grondin, the Ontario High Court rejected as a legitimate objective the
symbolic and practical exclusion from the political community of those who
breach their duty to society. 57 Yet later in 1988 Van Camp J., of the Ontario
High Court, in Sauvé (No. 1), accepted that the state had a legitimate interest
in preserving itself by the symbolic exclusion of criminals from the right to vote for
the lawmakers. So also, the exclusion of the criminal from the right to vote
reinforces the concept of a decent responsible citizenry essential for a liberal
democracy.58

This reasoning was adopted that same year by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in
the Badger case.59
The 1990s brought a judicial change of view. The trial judge in the
Belczowski case stated that he was unable to see a legitimate objective in
requiring a decent and responsible citizenry. 60 The Federal Court of Appeal
agreed, with the court holding that the symbolic and abstract objectives
advanced by the Crown were not sufficiently important to justify the
infringement of the right to vote.61 Justice Hugessen continued:
It is, of course, true that legislation may legitimately have a purely symbolic
objective. The question on the first branch of the Oakes test, however, is not the
legitimacy of the legislative purpose but rather its importance, that is to say
whether it is “pressing and substantial”. For my part, I must say that I have very
serious doubts whether a wholly symbolic objective can ever be sufficiently
important to justify the taking away of rights which are themselves so important
and fundamental as to have been enshrined in our Constitution. To accept
symbolism as a legitimate reason for the denial of Charter rights seems to me to be
a course fraught with danger. Even on the lower test of a “desirable social
objective” suggested in Andrews, I would have thought that such objective would
have to translate into some real intended benefit and not merely some abstract or
symbolic notion.62

56

Re Reynolds and Attorney-General of British Columbia (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 380, at
387-88 (C.A.).
57
Grondin v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 427, at 431-32 (H.C.), per
Bowlby, J.
58
Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General) (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 234, at 238 (H.C.J.).
59
Badger v. Canada (Attorney General) (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 177 (Man. C.A.); leave to
appeal refd [1989] 1 S.C.R. v.
60
Belczowski v. Canada, [1991] 3 F.C. 151 (T.D.); affd [1992] 2 F.C. 440; affd [1993] 2
S.C.R. 438.
61
Id., [1992] 2 F.C. 440, at 456 (C.A.).
62
Id., at 456-57.

Job name: SCLR vol 20

CRA

Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012

(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Sauvé and Prisoner’s Voting Rights

311

That same year Arbour, J.A., authored the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment
in Sauvé (No. 1), overturning the decision of Van Camp, J. Presaging the view
of the majority in Sauvé (No. 2), Arbour, J.A., agreed with Hugessen J.A. in
Belczowski:
that the highly symbolic and abstract nature of this objective advanced by the
respondents detracts from its importance as a justification for the violation of a
constitutionally protected right.

She continued:
I would also add that the slow movement toward universal suffrage in Western
democracies took an irreversible step forward in Canada in 1982 by the enactment
of s. 3 of the Charter. I doubt that anyone could now be deprived of the vote on the
basis, not merely symbolic but actually demonstrated, that he or she was not decent
or responsible.63

Then, several months before the Supreme Court released its judgment in
Sauvé (No. 2), Arbour J. again voiced her scepticism about the legitimacy of
abstract government objectives in Lavoie, a case involving the preference given
to Canadian citizens in the public service hiring regime set out in the Public
Service Employment Act:
Having moved quickly from a finding that s. 16(4)(c) of the PSEA makes a
distinction on an enumerated or analogous ground to the conclusion that the
claimants’ s. 15(1) rights were violated on the basis they felt subjectively
discriminated against, Bastarache J. proceeds to find that the violation is justified
under s. 1. For myself, I cannot accept that the violation of so sacrosanct a right as
the guarantee of equality is justified where the government is pursuing an objective
as abstract and general as the promotion of naturalization.64

Several months later, in her judgment in Sauvé (No. 2), the Chief Justice
built on Arbour J.’s views about abstract and symbolic legislative objectives.
The majority concluded that only legislation “directed at a specific problem or
concern”65 or “particular problems”66 can pass Charter muster under section 1.
Legislation with “broad objectives” or “vague and symbolic objectives” likely
will fail because “demonstrable justification requires that the objective clearly
reveal the harm that the government hopes to remedy”;67 under section 1 one
must ascertain “what [legislation] is expected to achieve in concrete terms.”
63

Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General) (1992), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 644, at 650-51 (Ont. C.A.).
Lavoie, supra, note 52, at para. 85. Justice Bastarache, writing the plurality opinion, did
not respond to this comment.
65
Sauvé, supra, note 51, at para. 21.
66
Id., at para. 26.
67
Id., at para. 23.
64
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The majority went so far as to say that the “rhetorical nature of the government
objectives … renders them suspect.”68
Far from regarding symbolic objectives as problematic, the minority viewed
symbolic legislative objectives as playing an important role in a democracy:
Symbolic or abstract arguments cannot be dismissed outright by virtue of their
symbolism: many of the great principles, the values upon which society rests, could
be said to be symbolic. In fact, one of the more important dimensions of s. 3 of the
Charter is clearly its symbolism: the affirmation of political equality reflected in all
citizens being guaranteed the right to vote, subject only to reasonable limits
prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society. The case at bar concerns debates about symbolism, as the arguments
involved relate to abstract concepts such as democracy, rights, punishment, the rule
of law and civic responsibility. To choose a narrow reading of rights over the
objectives advanced by Parliament is to choose one set of symbols over another.69

Intuiting that a vibrant and coherent democratic society relies on some use of
the symbolic, the minority’s view about the constitutional legitimacy of
symbolic or abstract legislative objectives finds support from two sources. 70
Ironically, the first source rests in the majority’s judgment in Sauvé, for the
majority itself relied on abstract values in concluding that the government’s
reliance on abstract values, such as enhancing the respect for the law, failed the
rational connection analysis. The Chief Justice wrote:
In sum, the legitimacy of the law and the obligation to obey the law flow directly
from the right of every citizen to vote. As a practical matter, we require all within
our country’s boundaries to obey its laws, whether or not they vote. But this does
not negate the vital symbolic, theoretical and practical connection between having
a voice in making the law and being obliged to obey it. This connection, inherited

68

Id., at paras. 22 and 23.
Id., at para. 99. The trial judge in Sauvé referred to The Sociology of Law by Cotterrell in
which the author pointed to the role of symbols of government and law in contributing to social
integration: Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (1995), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 136, at 151
(F.C.T.D.).
70
The Court’s 1996 decision in Harvey, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876, involved a consideration of the
provisions of the New Brunswick Elections Act expelling a sitting member of the Legislative
Assembly upon conviction of committing an “illegal practice,” defined as a set of election-related
offences. In upholding the provisions under section 1 of the Charter, the Court had no difficulty in
finding that the legislative objective of maintaining and enhancing the integrity of the electoral
process was a pressing and substantial concern and capable of surviving a rational connection
analysis. Perhaps the Court in Harvey regarded the legislative objective as more concrete in nature
than that in Sauvé since the statutory provisions were designed to prevent interference in the actual
election process.
69
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from social contract theory and enshrined in the Charter, stands at the heart of our
system of constitutional democracy.71

At the level of the symbolic, the majority saw the rule of law promoted by an
unlimited franchise, whereas the minority regarded the symbolism of the rule of
law enhanced by the disenfranchisement of those who commit a serious breach
of the law. Promotion of the symbolic or abstract played a role in both
judgments.
A second source of support for the minority’s recognition of the importance
of symbolic objectives lies in the Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning the
“unwritten principles” of the Constitution. In Provincial Judges Remuneration
Reference,72 the Court contended that “the Constitution embraces unwritten, as
well as written rules,”73 resting this conclusion in large part on the preamble to
the Constitution Act, 1867. Finding that the preamble articulated the political
theory embodied in the Constitution and elaborated the organizing principles in
the institutional apparatus created by the Constitution, the Court stated that the
preamble invited “the use of those organizing principles to fill out the gaps in
the express terms of the constitutional scheme.” 74 Later in Quebec Secession
Reference, the Court described these unwritten principles as the “vital unstated
assumptions upon which the text is based”75 and identified “four foundational
constitutional principles:” federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule
of law, and respect for minority rights.76
Each of these foundational principles contains elements of the abstract and
the symbolic. The rule of law, for example, was styled by the Court as “a
highly textured expression, importing many things … but conveying, for
example, a sense of orderliness, of subjection to know legal rules and of
executive accountability to legal authority.” 77 While the Court acknowledged in
the Quebec Secession Reference that these principles might appear general or
abstract, it emphasized that “these principles are not merely descriptive, but are
also invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding upon both
courts and governments.”78 The unanimous Court stated:

71

Supra, note 51, at para. 31 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 92.
73
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
74
Id., at paras. 92-95, per Lamer, C.J.
75
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 49.
76
Id., at para. 49.
77
Id., at para. 70.
78
Id., at para. 54.
72
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Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to
substantive legal obligations (have “full legal force” as we described it in the
Patriation Reference …) which constitute substantive limitations upon government
action. These principles may give rise to very abstract and general obligations, or
they may be more specific and precise in nature.79

One is thus forced to ask: if the unwritten principles of the Constitution can
give rise to “abstract” obligations, and such general principles form part of the
warp and weft upon which our political institutions are built, why is it not
legitimate for the government to enact legislation whose objective is to promote
and achieve those general principles and abstract obligations? In Sauvé the
government advanced enhancing respect for the rule of law as one of the
objectives of the legislative restriction on the franchisement. If the rule of law
carries sufficient political weight to receive judicial designation as an unwritten
constitutional principle, it is very difficult to understand how the majority could
conclude that a legislative objective designed to enhance the respect for that
unwritten constitutional principle was “suspect.”

IV.

PRISONERS AS “CITIZEN LAW-BREAKERS:” THE DEATH OF
THE GOOD CITIZEN?

Depriving prisoners of the right to vote involves passing a moral judgment
on prisoners that the majority in Sauvé regarded as unwarranted. Conviction for
the commission of a crime does not signal that a person is morally unworthy,
said the majority, and any such suggestion rests on an improper attribution80 of
moral character. The majority offers several reasons why the government
cannot find prisoners to be morally unworthy of the right to vote. Pointing to
the language of section 3 of the Charter, the majority states:
… the government is making a decision that some people, whatever their abilities,
are not morally worthy to vote — that they do not “deserve” to be considered
members of the community and hence may be deprived of the most basic of their
constitutional rights. But this is not the lawmakers’ decision to make. The Charter
makes this decision for us by guaranteeing the right of “every citizen” to vote and
by expressly placing prisoners under the protective umbrella of the Charter through
constitutional limits on punishment. The Charter emphatically says that prisoners

79

Id., at para. 54 (emphasis added).
“Denial of the right to vote on the basis of attributed moral unworthiness is inconsistent
with the respect for the dignity of every person that lies at the heart of Canadian democracy and the
Charter …” Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 44.
80
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are protected citizens, and short of a constitutional amendment, lawmakers cannot
change this.”81

Coining a new phrase, “citizen law-breaker,” the majority states that
“denying citizen law-breakers the right to vote sends the message that those
who commit serious breaches are no longer valued as members of the
community, but instead are temporary outcasts from our system of rights and
democracy.”82 The Chief Justice describes as “untenable” the proposition “that
the commission of a serious crime signals that the offender has chosen to ‘opt
out’ of community membership.” But, one might respond, the rights in section
3 are subject to limitation under section 1 of the Charter, so does not the
Charter leave open the door to Parliament to conclude that prisoners “are not
morally worthy to vote”? The majority never answers that question, but
repeatedly signals its displeasure that Parliament has passed a moral judgment
on prisoners and found them wanting by linking prisoners with others who in
the past were denied the right to vote. 83 In the eyes of the majority the
repugnance we feel today towards the historical disenfranchisement of blacks,
women and aboriginal peoples must now be directed with equal force to
prisoners, those who have been convicted of breaking the criminal law of the
country.
Of course, the minority was having nothing of this. Disqualification of
prisoners, in their view, differed qualitatively from other historical exclusions
from the franchise because prisoners were deprived of the vote for what they
did, not who they were:
The provision in question in the case at bar, however, is strikingly and qualitatively
different from these past discriminatory exclusions. It is a temporary suspension
from voting based exclusively on the serious criminal activity of the offender. It is
the length of the sentence, reflecting the nature of the offence and the criminal
activity committed, that results in the temporary disenfranchisement during
incarceration. Thus, far from being repugnant and discriminatory, based on some
irrelevant personal characteristic, such as gender, race, or religion, s. 51(e) of the
Act distinguishes persons based on the perpetrating of acts that are condemned by
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.84

As Gonthier, J. concluded: “Responsible citizenship” does not relate to what
gender, race, or religion a person belongs to, but is logically related to whether

81

Id., at para. 37.
Id., at para. 40.
83
“The idea that certain classes of people are not morally fit or morally worthy to vote and
to participate in the law-making process is ancient and obsolete.” Id., at para. 43.
84
Id., at para. 69.
82
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or not a person engages in serious criminal activity. 85 Nor does the suspension
of a prisoner’s right to vote adversely affect his or her sense of “dignity:”
… it could be said that the notion of punishment is predicated on the dignity of the
individual: it recognizes serious criminals as rational, autonomous individuals who
have made choices. When these citizens exercise their freedom in a criminal
manner, society imposes a concomitant responsibility for that choice. 86

Several important issues are engaged by these differing moral perspectives.
In the majority’s reluctance to regard incarceration for committing a criminal
conviction as an indication of moral wrongdoing by a person, one sees the
influence of the equality analysis that has evolved in recent years under section
15 of the Charter, especially with the post-Law focus on human dignity. The
strain of moral neutrality permeating much of the section 15 analysis now
appears poised to move into the one area of law based on community moral
judgments, the criminal law.
A second, related implication, concerns the confusion the majority decision
in Sauvé creates about the relationship between social contract theory that has
underpinned modern liberalism (and of which the Charter is a direct progeny)
and any conception of civic responsibility or morality. The Chief Justice
acknowledges the link between social contract theory and the Charter, 87 but
with her use of the phrase “citizen law-breakers” leaves the suggestion that
under the Charter the social contract is a one-way street, with little in the way
of reciprocal obligations owed by the individual to the community. How else
can one understand her assertion that it is “untenable” “that the commission of
a serious crime signals that the offender has chosen to ‘opt out’ of community
membership?”88
By contrast, the minority regards social contract theory as imposing
obligations as well as giving rise to rights, in particular imposing the obligation
to obey the law:
The denunciation of crime and its effects on society is often explained by reference to the notion of the social contract. The social contract is the theoretical basis
upon which the exercise of rights and participation in the democratic process rests.

85

Id., at para. 70.
Id., at para. 73.
87
Id., at para. 31.
88
The Lortie Commission took a similar approach, rejecting as unwarranted the assumption
that by violating the law a prisoner had demonstrated that he or she was unwilling to abide by the
norms of responsible citizenship. The Commission did not regard violating the laws as equivalent
to violating “the social foundations of liberal democracy.” Supra, note 25, at 43.
86
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In my view, the social contract necessarily relies upon the acceptance of the rule of
law and civic responsibility and on society’s need to promote the same … 89
Related to the notion of the social contract is the importance of reinforcing the
significance of the relationship between individuals and their community when it
comes to voting. This special relationship is inherent in the fact that it is only “citizens” who are guaranteed the right to vote within s. 3 of the Charter. This limitation of the scope of s. 3 of the Charter stands in stark contrast to the protections
offered by the fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights in the Charter, which are available to “everyone” or to “every individual”. I am of the view
that this limitation reflects the special relationship, characterized by entitlements
and responsibilities, between citizens and their community. It is this special relationship and its responsibilities which serious criminal offenders have assaulted.90

This view conforms with the position of the classical social contractarians, as
succinctly summarized by Zdravko Planinc, in his article, “Should Imprisoned
Criminals have a Constitutional Right to Vote?:”
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant would all consider it unreasonable, but perhaps
not surprising, for a prisoner to argue that he did not consent to give up his
citizenship upon entering a prison, and that he is therefore not a subject but a
citizen entitled to vote. They would also all agree about why it is unreasonable.
Men consent to live together in a society under the rule of law. The society’s form
of government determines who is a citizen and who is simply a subject. In a
democracy most subjects will be citizens, or will be eligible to become citizens.
Now, when a man commits a criminal act, he acts against the nature of the
commonwealth itself. His rights of citizenship are immediately forfeit because his
participation in the commonwealth has been called into question. The irrationality
of considering criminals to be citizens is stated succinctly by Kant:
In my role as colegislator making the penal law, I cannot be the same person who, as a subject, is punished by the law; for, as a subject who is also a
criminal, I cannot have a voice in legislation.
Therefore, the only way for a criminal to become a citizen is by “the errour of them
that receive him,” in Hobbes’ words.”91

A similar approach was taken by the most prominent modern exponent of
social contract theory, John Rawls, who acknowledged that in a well-ordered
society the coercive powers of government are to some degree necessary for the

89

Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 115.
Id., at para. 117 (emphasis added).
91
Planinc, “Should Imprisoned Criminals have a Constitutional Right to Vote?” (1987) 2
C.J.L.S. 153, at 157-58.
90
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stability of social co-operation92 and that those who are punished for violating
laws are normally regarded as having done something wrong. In A Theory of
Justice Rawls wrote:
… the purpose of the criminal law is to uphold basic natural duties, those which
forbid us to injure other persons in their life and limb, or to deprive them of their
liberty and property, and punishments are to serve this end. They are not simply a
scheme of taxes and burdens designed to put a price on certain forms of conduct
and in this way to guide men’s conduct for mutual advantage. It would be far better
if the acts proscribed by penal statutes were never done. Thus a propensity to
commit such acts is a mark of bad character, and in a just society legal punishments
will only fall upon those who display these faults.93

Under Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, where persons have agreed to
penalties to stabilize a scheme of social co-operation, they are recognizing
constraints on self-interest and “it is rational to authorize the measures needed
to maintain just institutions.” To those who cannot act justly (i.e., within the
law), Rawls simply responds: “their nature is their misfortune.” 94
All of which raises a fundamental question: does the concept of citizenship
under the Canadian Charter embody any notion that citizens owe
responsibilities to the larger political community? One can point readily to
sections of the Charter that identify rights that accompany citizenship — the
right to vote (section 3), mobility rights (section 6) and minority language
educational rights (section 23) — but the jurisprudence contains little
discussion about the duties that Canadian citizens owe to their political
communities. Two cases — Andrews95 and Lavoie96 — considered the
constitutional adequacy of citizenship as a marker for entitlement to
government benefits, but they included little discussion of the responsibilities
of citizenship. In Andrews, McIntyre, J. referred to the “obligations” of
citizenship,97 without further elaboration. In the same decision, LaForest, J.
described citizenship as a “very special status that not only incorporates rights
and duties but serves a highly important symbolic function as a badge
identifying people as members of the Canadian polity;” 98 but he too offered no
description of a citizen’s duties.

92
See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1999), at 10-11 and 14-15.
93
Id., at 276-77.
94
Id., at 504.
95
Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
96
(2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
97
Id., at para. 60.
98
Id., at para. 70.
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It is unfortunate that the majority in Sauvé dismissed the government’s
evidence about civic virtues and civic responsibility as unhelpful “vague
appeals.”99 By so doing it cut short the beginnings of a debate long overdue in
Canadian constitutional law — the relationship between the Charter and civic
responsibility. The neglect of the place of obligations in the contemporary
discussion of legal rights has long been observed,100 and even John Stuart Mill,
the political philosopher relied on by the majority in Sauvé, regarded the
superiority of democracy as lying in the fact that it calls upon the citizen “to
weigh interests not his [or her] own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims,
by another rule than his [or her] private partialities; to apply at every turn,
principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good
…”101 With its conclusion that the political community cannot sanction the
“citizen law-breaker” by suspending his or her political rights during
incarceration, the Supreme Court may have left little room for the development
of any notion under the Charter of a “civic responsibility” that involves the
mutual interaction of political obligations and rights.

V.

JOHN STUART MILL AS THE POSTER BOY FOR THE EXPANDED
FRANCHISE, OR HOW SHOULD THE COURT USE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY?

1. The Use of John Stuart Mill in the Sauvé Decision
Grudgingly accepting one of the government’s proferred objectives for
section 51(e) — the enhancement of civic responsibility and respect for the rule
of law — as “capable in principle of justifying limitations on Charter rights,” 102
the majority concluded that the government had failed to demonstrate that a
rational connection existed between the legislative limitation and the offered
objective.103 The majority curtly rejected the government’s contention that
depriving some inmates of the right to vote sends an “educative message” about
the importance of respect for the law to inmates and to the citizenry at large:
The problem, here, quite simply, is that denying penitentiary inmates the right to
vote is bad pedagogy. It misrepresents the nature of our rights and obligations

99

Supra, note 89, at para. 37.
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free
Press, 1991).
101
Quoted Mortimer Adler in his essay, “Citizenship,” in The Great Ideas, A Lexicon of
Western Thought (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1992), at 98.
102
Supra, note 89, at para. 19.
103
Id., at para. 28.
100
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under the law, and it communicates a message more likely to harm than to help
respect for the law.104

Arguing that lawmakers act as citizens’ proxies, the majority stated that “the
legitimacy of the law and the obligation to obey the law flow directly from the
right of every citizen to vote.”105 Noting the “vital symbolic, theoretical and
practical connection between having a voice in making the law and being
obliged to obey it,”106 the majority contended that any disenfranchisement of
inmates is both “anti-democratic and internally self-contradictory”107 because
denying its citizens the right to vote denies the “truth” that voting is the basis of
democratic legitimacy.
After briefly reviewing the history of progressive enfranchisement in
Canada, the majority then stated that depriving at risk individuals of their sense
of collective identity and membership in the community is unlikely to instil a
sense of responsibility and community identity, “while the right to participate
in voting helps teach democratic values and social responsibility.” 108 The Chief
Justice then immediately proceeded to quote from John Stuart Mill’s 1859
essay, “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform:”
To take an active interest in politics is, in modern times, the first thing which
elevates the mind to large interests and contemplations; the first step out of the
narrow bounds of individual and family selfishness, the first opening in the
contracted round of daily occupations. … The possession and the exercise of
political, and among others of electoral, rights, is one of the chief instruments both
of moral and of intellectual training for the popular mind.109

She concluded: “To deny a prisoner the right to vote is to lose an important
means of teaching them democratic values and social responsibility.”110
The passage from Mill’s essay was contained in the report of one of the
government’s experts, Dr. Thomas Pangle, a professor of political philosophy
at the University of Toronto.111 While the majority did not quote further from
Mill, they did make two further references to him. First, in rejecting that either
the record or common sense supported the claim that disenfranchisement deters
crime or rehabilitates criminals, the Chief Justice wrote: “… as Mill recognized

104

Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 31.
106
Id., at para. 31.
107
Id., at para. 32.
108
Id., at para. 38.
109
Id., at para. 38.
110
Id.
111
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), S.C.C. Court File No. 27677, Appellants’ Record [hereinafter “Appellants’ Record”], Vol. III, at 477.
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long ago, participation in the political process offers a valuable means of
teaching democratic values and civic responsibility.” 112 Then, in its analysis on
the proportionate effect of the legislation, the majority contended that denying
prisoners the right to vote imposed negative costs on prisoners and on the penal
system: “[i]t removes a route to social development and rehabilitation
acknowledged since the time of Mill, and it undermines correctional law and
policy directed towards rehabilitation and integration …”113
As the following passage suggests, the minority appeared to accept that
Mill’s thought stood for the extension of the franchise to prisoners:
Citing J.S. Mill as her authority, [the Chief Justice] states that “denying
penitentiary inmates the right to vote is more likely to send messages that
undermine respect for the law and democracy than message that enhance those
values” (para. 41). However, apart from one philosopher, she provides no support
for this contention; she simply replaces one reasonable position with another,
dismissing the government’s position as “unhelpful” (para. 37 of the Chief Justice’s
reasons).”114

Both the majority and minority thus proceeded on the basis that Mill’s
thought generally supported the expansion of the franchise to teach democratic
values and social responsibility and, more specifically, supported the extension
of the franchise to prisoners. However, a fuller consideration of Mill’s political
thought calls both suppositions of the Court into question.
2. The Dangers of “Proof-Texting”
Dealing first with the view that Mill regarded the expansion of the franchise
as a means to teach democratic values and social responsibility, had the Court
in Sauvé canvassed Mill’s general views on the franchise they might have
reconsidered relying on his work. For in fact, in his quest to ensure an informed
electorate, Mill proposed several restrictions on the franchise. Mill’s 1859
essay, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, quoted by the majority was
followed two years later by his more famous essay, Representative
Government.115 As the name suggests, in the essay Mill argued that the best
form of government is “representative government.” After sketching out a plan
for proportional representation that would ensure some representation of
minorities in a representative government, Mill turned, in Chapter 8 of the
112

Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 49.
Id., at para. 59.
114
Id., at para. 157.
115
Biographical note, Great Books (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1990), Vol. 40,
at 264.
113
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essay, to the question of the extension of the suffrage. After referring to
de Tocqueville’s work, Democracy in America, showing the connections
between the “potent instrument of mental improvement in the exercise of
political franchise by manual labourers” and democratic institutions, Mill extols
the virtues of the franchise in language that would appeal to the majority of the
Court:
Independently of all these considerations, it is a personal injustice to withhold from
anyone, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having his
voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs which he has the same interest as other
people. If he is compelled to pay, if he may be compelled to fight, if he is required
implicitly to obey, he should be legally entitled to be told what for; to have his
consent asked, and his opinion counted at its worth, though not at more than its worth.
There ought to be no pariahs in a full-grown and civilized nation …
… Everyone is degraded, whether aware of it or not, when other people, without
consulting him, take upon themselves unlimited power to regulate its destiny. …
No arrangement of the suffrage, therefore, can be permanently satisfactory in which
any person or class is peremptorily excluded; in which the electoral privilege is not
open to all persons of full age who desire to obtain it.116

Nevertheless, certain caveats followed these expansive statements. To
complete one of the passages just quoted, Mill wrote: “There ought to be no
pariahs in a full-grown and civilized nation; no persons disqualified, except
through their own default.”117 More broadly, Mill contended that there are
“certain exclusions, required by positive reasons, which do not conflict with
this principle, and which, though an evil in themselves, are only to be got rid of
by the cessation of the state of things which requires them.” 118 What then are
these “exclusions required by positive reasons” from the suffrage? To vote,
Mill wrote, one must at least have “… acquired the commonest and most
essential requisites for taking care of themselves; for pursuing intelligently their
own interests, and those of the persons most nearly allied to them.” 119
Accordingly, the franchise should not extend to those who cannot read, write,
or calculate.120 A financial interest in the affairs of the community was also, in
116

Representative Government, id., at 382.
Id. (emphasis added).
118
Id.
119
Id., at 382-83.
120
In regard, however, to reading, writing and calculating, there need be no difficulty. It
would be easy to require from everyone who presented himself [or herself] for registry that
he [or she] should, in the presence of the registrar, copy a sentence from an English book,
and perform a sum in the rule of three; and to secure, by fixed rules and complete publicity,
the honest application of so very simple a test. This condition, therefore, should in all cases
accompany universal suffrage; and it would, after a few years, exclude none but those who
117
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Mill’s view, a requisite for the franchise. 121 Building on this, Mill advocated
that “taxation, in a visible shape, should descend to the poorest class” and that:
a direct tax, in a simple form of a capitation, should be levied on every grown
person in the community … that so everyone might feel that the money which he
assisted in voting was partly his own, and that he was interested in keeping down
its amount.122

Further, Mill advocated that those on welfare should not enjoy the franchise, at
least while they are on the dole.123
Isaiah Berlin once wrote of Mill’s “fear of ignorant and irrational democracy
and consequent craving for government by the enlightened and the expert.” 124
In light of Mill’s advocacy of these restrictions on the franchise, restrictions
that would offend our current sensibilities of human dignity, there is a certain
irony that shortly before the majority in Sauvé quoted Mill so approvingly, the
Chief Justice had written:

cared so little for the privilege, that their vote, if given, would not in general be an indication of any real political opinion.
Id., at 383.
121
It is also important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local,
should be elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed.
Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people’s money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economize. As far as money matters are concerned, any power
of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government;
as severance of the power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts
to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they
think fit to call a public one …
Id., at 383.
122
Id., at 383.
123
I regarded as required by first principles, that the receipt of parish relief should be a
peremptory disqualification for the franchise. He who cannot by his labour suffice for his
own support has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others. By becoming dependent on the reaming members of the community for actual subsistence, he abdicates his claim to equal rights with them in other respects. … As a condition of the
franchise, a term should be fixed, say five years previous to the registry, during which the
applicant’s name has not been on the parish books as a recipient of relief. To be an uncertified bankrupt, or to have taken the benefit of the Insolvent Act, should disqualify for the
franchise until the person has paid his debts, or at least proved that he is not now, and has
not for some long period been, dependent on eleemosynary support. Non-payment of taxes,
when so long persistent in that it cannot have arisen from inadvertence, should disqualify
while it lasts.
Id., at 383-84.
124
Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life,” in Liberty, Hardy, ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), at 227.
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The right of citizens to vote, regardless of virtue or mental ability or other
distinguishing features, underpins the legitimacy of Canadian democracy and
Parliament’s claim to power. A government that restricts the franchise to a select
portion of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the
legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes its claim to
representative democracy, and erodes the bias of its right to convict and punish
law-breakers.125

A second element of Mill’s thought might have given the Court pause to
advance him as the exemplar of the universal franchise. Mill was not a
proponent of “one person, one vote.” Immediately following his discussion in
Representative Government of permissible restrictions on the suffrage, Mill
proceeded to advocate “plural voting,” a system under which persons could cast
different numbers of votes in an election. As Mill pithily explained: “but
though everyone ought to have a voice — that everyone should have an equal
voice is a totally different proposition.”126 In his view, some persons would
have more than one vote “on the ground of greater capacity for the management
of the joint interest” of the polity. Since the only thing “which can justify
reckoning one person’s opinion as equivalent to more than one is individual
mental superiority,” Mill proposed a system under which some persons would
be allowed two or more votes depending upon whether they exercised a
“superior function” based on their higher degree of education or the nature of
their profession.127
Section 3 of the Charter does not explicitly embody a principle of “one
person, one vote,” and in the Saskatchewan Electoral Boundary Reference the
Supreme Court opined that “the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of
the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to ‘effective
representation.’” 128 In that case, however, the Court went on to describe
“effective representation” as encompassing “relative parity of voting power,”
so presumably Mill’s proposal for “plural voting” based on “superior function”
would not meet that requirement and would run counter to the majority’s view
in Sauvé that franchise conditions tied to “virtue or mental ability or other
distinguishing features” run counter to the legitimacy of Canadian democracy.
As Planinc points out, Mill’s utilitarianism provides no support for arguments
in favour of granting democratic rights to prisoners because Mill bases his

125

Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 34.
Mill, Representative Government, supra, note 117, at 384.
127
Id., at 385.
128
Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at 183, per
McLachlin J. (as she then was).
126
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political arguments on an assessment of the relative worth of persons, an
approach specifically rejected by the majority in Sauvé.129
In fairness to the Court, in his affidavit Professor Pangle did not expressly
point out Mill’s proposals for limitations on the franchise nor Mill’s advocacy
of “plural voting.” Professor Pangle’s affidavit did include an historical section
on how disenfranchisement had been used to exclude those “supposed to lack a
minimal level of understanding or a minimal level of responsibility” 130
(consistent with Mill’s position), but the professor did not directly reference
Mill in that section.
Nevertheless, the majority’s use of Mill squarely raises the dangers of using
statements from political philosophers to proof-text a judicial conclusion or
policy choice. Political theories invariably are multi-dimensional and change
over the lifetime of a philosopher, making it very difficult to extract a particular
phrase or statement in any meaningful way without having regard to the overall
corpus of the political philosopher. As the Court constantly emphasizes in its
Charter jurisprudence, context is all-important; the same holds true when using
political philosophy to support judicial conclusions.
3. Mill’s Specific Views on the Franchise for Prisoners
On the specific issue of prisoner voting, the Court proceeded on the basis
that Mill’s political philosophy supported the extension of the franchise to
prisoners. In fact, Mill did not support extending the franchise to all prisoners
and that was made clear in the record before the Court.
Dealing first with Mill’s position, the quotation from Mill’s essay,
“Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” which the majority used in its judgment is
found in a paragraph that begins with the following sentence:
First, then, in every system of representation which can be conceived as perfect,
every adult human being*, it appears to me, would have the means of exercising,
through the electoral suffrage, a portion of influence on the management of public
affairs.131

The footnote indicated by the asterisk directly deals with the issue of
prisoner voting, wrapping a distinctly moral character around the issue. Mill’s
footnote, in its entirety, reads as follows:

129

Planinc, supra, note 91, at 159.
Affidavit of Professor Thomas Pangle, “Voting Rights of Inmates,” Appellants’ Record,
Vol. III, at 455-59.
131
Mill, Essays on Politics and Society, J.M. Robson, ed. (1977), at 322.
130
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I pass over the question whether insane persons, or persons convicted of crime,
should be exceptions to this general provision. As far as the direct influence of their
votes went, it would scarcely be worth while to exclude them. But, as an aid to the
great object of giving a moral character to the exercise of the suffrage, it might be
expedient that in the case of crimes evincing a high degree of insensibility to social
obligation, the deprivation of this and other civic rights should form part of the
sentence.132

In the case of serious crime Mill appears more than amenable to depriving a
criminal of the franchise, and perhaps other “civic rights” as part of the
sentence. (A proposal actually raised by Wetston, J., the trial judge in Sauvé
(No. 2)). As it turns out, the Supreme Court’s champion of the franchise for
prisoners actually supported restricting the franchise in the case of serious
crime.
Mill’s position was made clear in the record before the court. In his expert
report Professor Pangle directly dealt with Mill’s footnote, writing:
It is in the light of these considerations that Mill takes up — to be sure, in a
footnote — the question of the disenfranchisement of “persons convicted of crime.”
“As far as the direct influence of their votes went, it would scarcely be worth while
to exclude them,” Mill opines. He apparently means, not that their votes are
without influence on the outcome of the elections, but that the expense or
inconvenience of policing the exclusion would outweigh the small benefit, given
the minuscule proportion criminals make up of the voting population, and therefore
the relatively small danger they pose of affecting improperly the outcome. Yet this
consideration is eclipsed, or indeed reversed, by a second, and far more important
consideration — the effect on the education dimension of the voting process. For,
once one attends to this dimension, one sees immediately that every single person’s
vote must be taken seriously, and treated as a matter of moment, above all in the
law and in every legal proclamation. To proclaim in law that any class or person’s
vote is so insignificant that the abuse of it is a matter of little consequence is to take
the first step in undermining respect for voting altogether.133

After pointing to a research study performed for the Lortie Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform which illustrated, in Dr. Pangle’s view:
how easy it is to begin to express open contempt for the votes of all individuals in a
democracy once one becomes wedded to the idea that incarcerated criminals should
not be disqualified134

Dr. Pangle returned to Mill and his footnote in Thoughts on Parliamentary
Reform:
132

Id., at 322 (emphasis added).
Expert Report of Dr. Pangle, Appellants’ Record III, at 478, lines 10-34.
134
Id., at 478.
133
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John Stuart Mill was too wise to slip into such irresponsible thinking. As he put it
in his Westminister Election Address of 22 July 1868, “a vote for a member of
Parliament is always a grave moral responsibility.” Accordingly, Mill proceeds to
consider the question in the light of “the great object,” that is, the object “of giving
a moral character to the exercise of the suffrage.” It is as “an aid to the great
object,” that he argues that it might be expedient “that in case of crimes evincing a
high degree of insensibility to social obligation, the deprivation of this and other
civil rights should form part of the sentence.135

Dr. Pangle also dealt with Mill’s footnote in his trial testimony, which was
reproduced in the appeal record before the Court:
Q. …As I understand it, sir, the actual issue of disenfranchisement with respect to
inmates … is never specifically addressed by any one thinker or tradition
except … in a footnote by John Stuart Mill; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s right. This particular or specific question of the enfranchisement or
disenfranchisement of inmates or even more specifically inmates convicted
for serious offences has, so far as I know, not been addressed in any —
thematically, except in the footnote, but an important footnote in John
Stuart Mill’s Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform where he does address it
and declares quite emphatically his view …
Q. His view, just in passing, was what?
A. That prisoners convicted of serious offences should be disenfranchised.136

Mill’s contention in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform that those convicted
of serious crimes could be deprived of the right to vote “and other civil rights”
is consistent with his position two years later in Representative Government
that there ought to be no persons disqualified from the franchise “except
through their own default.” 137 It is therefore troubling that the Court, by
whatever means,138 ended up relying on Mill’s political philosophy to support a
conclusion evidently inconsistent with Mill’s own thinking on the matter. 139

135
Id., at 479 (emphasis added). Professor Pangle cites that the underlined quotation from
Mill came from The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 19, at 322n, the same page from
which he drew the passage quoted by the majority in Sauvé (emphasis added).
136
Appellants’ Record, Vol. IX, at 1146.
137
Mill, Representative Government, Great Books, Vol. 40, at 382.
138
It strikes me that the culprit might lie in the process of distilling the record through bench
memos or clerks’ draft opinions, with the members of the court not aware of the full context of a
particular quotation.
139
Indeed, in his expert report Professor Pangle drew quite opposite conclusions from his review of Mill:
Following Mill’s thought further, we must note that in the light of the fundamental notion of the social contract underlying liberal democratic theory, incarceration for serious
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4. Some General Observations on the Use of Political Philosophy in
Constitutional Cases
Constitutional cases, especially those decided since the enactment of the
Charter, have prompted the Court to wade into areas of social policy-making
that raise issues outside of the traditional realm of judicial interpretation and
decision-making. In the early days of the Charter the Court recognized that any
proper interpretation of the provisions of the Charter would require an
assessment of a right or freedom in the context of the broader traditions that
had predated the Charter. As Dickson C.J. observed in Big M Drug Mart:
… it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in
question but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must
therefore, as this Court’s decisions in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 illustrates, be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and
historical contexts.140

Later, in Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.),
McIntyre J. put the matter in a slightly different way:
It follows that while a liberal and not overly legalistic approach should be taken to
constitutional interpretation, the Charter should not be regarded as an empty vessel
to be filled with whatever meaning we might wish from time to time. The
interpretation of the Charter, as of all constitutional documents, is constrained by
the language, structure, and history of the constitutional text, by constitutional
tradition, and by the history, traditions, and underlying philosophies of our
society.141

In light of these admonitions and the Court’s use of the political philosophy
of John Stuart Mill in Sauvé, one is naturally inclined to ask: What use has the
court made of political philosophers? Who do they quote? How frequently? In
what context? To explore these questions a search was conducted of reported
crimes manifests yet another grave species of civil vice, in addition to and beyond the vices
we have explained in the context of our discussion of civic virtue as conceived in classical
republican theory. For in a society which conceives of itself as constituted by a universal
social contract, the serious criminal has not only been proven flagrantly to have ignored and
violated the requisite minimal concern and respect for fellow citizens, and has not only been
proven to have flagrantly manifested disrespect for the law and thus reneged on the electoral
process which culminates in the law; in addition, such an inmate has been proven to have
flagrantly violated the social contract. For it is the first and leading article of the social contract that each and every party solemnly promises and commits him-or herself to abide by
the future legal determinations, arrived at by due process, of the sovereign representative
selected by the majority vote of the contracting parties.
Appellants’ Record, Vol. III, at 479-80.
140
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344, at para. 117.
141
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 394.
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Supreme Court of Canada Charter decisions using the names of selected
political philosophers and legal theorists. The search parameters and results of
this preliminary search are set out in Appendix “A” of this article.
The results are quite surprising. First, while the Court is engaging in
deciding fundamental issues of moral and political philosophy, the judges make
little use of political philosophers. The Court has quoted 14 political
philosophers in only 24 cases since 1982, three of which involved either Mill’s
famous definition of direct taxes or Jefferson’s definition of a patent. Legal
theorists fare little better, with the court referring to four legal theorists in 25
cases.
Second, of the political philosophers John Stuart Mill is by far the Court’s
favourite, referred to in 14 cases, with Aristotle and Plato ranking second and
third. Putting to one side the two cases in which the Court quoted Mill’s
definition of a direct tax, it is easy to see from its remaining use of Mill why he is
such a court favourite. The Court quotes Mill to support two key themes that have
emerged in its Charter jurisprudence: (i) there is no one concept of the good life,
but we each must be free to pursue “our own good in our own way;”142 and (ii)
since each age develops its own notion of right and wrong, the law must protect
the importance of freedom to express contrary opinions143 and hence freedom of
expression seeks to protect the marketplace of ideas.144

142

In R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, Wilson J. (dissenting) at para. 74 wrote:
John Stuart Mill described it as “pursuing our own good in our own way.” This, he believed, we should be free to do “so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or
impede their efforts to obtain it”. He added:
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual.
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
She subsequently relied on this passage in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at para.
231. See also B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at
para. 74; Reference Re SS. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Manitoba), [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1123, at para. 50.
143
Per L’Heureux-Dubé in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1
S.C.R. 139, at para. 73:
However, as John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government (1946), at p. 16: “Yet it is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument
can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many
opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain
that many opinions now general will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.”
Also quoted in R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; see
also Cory, J. in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at para. 4.
quoting “On Liberty”: If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if
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At one level the reluctance of the Court to resort to the writings of political
philosophers as an aid to its resolution of public policy questions under the
Charter might stem from the discomfort the judges periodically express about
being thrust into the role of the nine wise philosophers. Iain Benson offers
another possible explanation for this infrequent use of political philosophers.
He notes that the Court has been inconsistent in its approach to drawing on
philosophic traditions, sometimes eschewing any proper role for philosophy in
the courts, and then proceeding on other occasions to quote philosophers in
support of their decisions. Benson terms this confusion as a “functional
metaphobia” — an undue fear and avoidance of metaphysics by the Court. 145
George Grant saw the matter in yet another light, as one involving judicial
education. In an essay written shortly before his death Grant observed, in his
own uncompromising way, that “the more contemporary judges quote
philosophy or religious tradition, the less they appear to understand what they
are dealing with … When society puts power into the hands of the courts, they
had better be educated.”146
Perhaps a further explanation can be found in one of the remarkable aspects
of the Sauvé case: it could be called the “Case of the Disappearing Record.”
Sauvé was commenced by way of action, not application. Consequently, it
resulted in a trial in the first instance. The evidence led before the trial judge
was extensive, especially on the section 1 issues, including the objectives of the
legislation; the appeal record before the Supreme Court of Canada ran to 12
volumes. Yet the citation of the evidence significantly declined from the trial
judgment to the decision of the Supreme Court. 147 Whereas the trial judge cited
the evidence 27 times, this was reduced to 10 citations by the majority of the
Federal Court of Appeal, ending up with the majority of the Supreme Court
citing the evidence only three times. (By contrast, the minority of the Federal
Court of Appeal made 11 citations, and the minority of the Supreme Court
made 12 citations). In both the Danson and MacKay cases the Supreme Court
emphasized the needs for facts, both adjudicative and legislative, in Charter

he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.” (followed by Iacobucci J. in Little
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at para. 272.
144
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, per Dickson C.J.C. at para 13.
145
Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the ‘Secular’ ” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519,
at 523-24.
146
Grant, “The Triumph of the Will,” in Gentles (ed.), Women, Abortion and Human Rights
(Toronto: Stoddart, 1990), at 18 and 213.
147
The decline can be observed in Appendix “C” of this article which records the judicial references made to the evidence.
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cases.148 Counsel in Sauvé responded appropriately; yet the majority of the
Court made little use of the evidentiary record.
A clue as to why the Court treated the evidence, especially the evidence on
political theory, in this way may lie in Gonthier J.’s remarks about the utility of
political theory evidence in determining Charter cases. In a passage that offers a
telling insight into self-image of the Court, Gonthier noted the large volume of
expert evidence before the Court and separated it into two categories: social
science evidence in the field of criminology, and evidence on legal and political
philosophy. As to the latter kind of evidence Gonthier J. wrote:
I do not think that the Court need necessarily defer to this second type of expertise,
or take into account the “skill” and “reputation” of the experts in weighing this
evidence … First, most if not all of the philosophers or theorists on which these
experts rely never in fact even addressed the specific issue of prisoner
enfranchisement or disenfranchisement. Second, legal theory expert testimony in
this context essentially purports to justify axiomatic principles. Therefore, these
arguments are either persuasive or not. In this context, it is appropriate for courts to
look not only to such theoretical arguments but also beyond, to factors such as the
extent of public debate on an issue, the practices of other liberal democracies and,
most especially, to the reasoned view of our democratically elected Parliament. 149

It is true that the only reference Professor Pangle could find amongst the
political philosophers to prisoner disenfranchisement was Mill’s footnote
discussed above (although Planinc found an additional reference in Kant), but
Gonthier J.’s first reservation misapprehends the point of political philosophy.
In large part political philosophers do not draw a detailed blueprint for every
facet of political life; they offer a conceptual framework that, in turn, can guide
the prudential consideration of specific political problems. This is actually what
the majority tried to do when it used Mill’s expansive quotation in support of
its advocacy of the prisoner franchise; its error lay in picking the wrong
philosopher to quote.
More troubling is Gonthier J.’s second reservation about political theory: it
doesn’t help a court because it simply contains axiomatic principles. With
respect, this is to misunderstand the process of considering issues of political
morality or civic organization such as those raised in Sauvé. Generally we
speak of axiomatic principles as consisting of self-evident truths: the principle
148

“Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. To attempt to do
so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered opinions. The presentation of
facts is not, as stated by the respondent, a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues. … Charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported hypotheses
of enthusiastic counsel.” MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361-62, as quoted by the
Supreme Court in Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at para. 29.
149
Sauvé, [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 101.
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of non-contradiction, or the fact that one plus one equals two. Political
philosophy entails a different type of exercise. In his classic essay, “What is
Political Philosophy?,” Leo Strauss ventured the following definition of
political philosophy:
Political philosophy will then be the attempt to replace opinion about the nature of
political things by knowledge of the nature of political things … To judge soundly
one must know the true standards. If political philosophy wishes to do justice to its
subject matter, it must strive for genuine knowledge of these standards. Political
philosophy is the attempt truly to know both the nature of political things and the
right, or the good, political order.150

Strauss hastens to add that political philosophy, like philosophy in general, is
“not the possession of the truth, but quest for the truth.” 151 In striving for
genuine knowledge, political philosophers reflect on human political
experience and needs. Far from asserting a set of axiomatic principles, political
philosophy offers a series of reasoned reflections across the ages on our
collective political experiences, proceeding on the assumption that as the
human race matures, its reflections on its political experiences will move it ever
closer to a knowledge of the “nature of political things and the right, or the
good, political order.”152 Political philosophy thus offers the Court both a rich
reflection on the key elements of the liberal traditions upon which the Charter
rests, as well as critiques on the limitations of the liberal political experiment. It
allows one to look at the Charter from both the inside and the outside, so to
speak.
If the Court turns its back on political philosophy, it risks being sucked into
that “vacuum” about which Dickson C.J. warned in Big M Drug Mart and
transforming the Charter into the “empty vessel” 153 which need only be filled
with the opinions of the day. Sauvé, in my view, starkly illustrates the two
possible outcomes of a rejection of a reflection on political philosophy and its
traditions. In the case of the majority, the judges simply ignored whatever
guidance the evidence on political philosophy might offer and, instead,
fashioned their own political opinion: they replaced the “bad pedagogy” of
prisoner disenfranchisement, with their own opinion of a proper pedagogy. The
judge as ideologue was their solution. The minority also turned away from the
advice of political philosophy, but with a more populist result. In its view the
answer lay outside of philosophical reflection, and in the arena of public
150

Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), at

11-12.
151

Id., at 11.
Id., at 12.
153
See supra, note 122.
152
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opinion. It would find greater guidance in “… the extent of public debate on an
issue, the practices of other liberal democracies and, most especially, to the
reasoned view of our democratically elected Parliament.” 154 Popular opinion
becomes the seat of political wisdom. 155
Of course, a final explanation may explain the Court’s limited use of
political philosophy and it may rest closer to the truth. Perhaps the Court has
already chosen its political philosophy and concluded that it need not refer to
any others. Which brings us back to Mill and his overwhelming popularity with
the Court. One could argue that the Court has concluded that the Charter rejects
the possibility of any true standards or the “right, or the good, political order”
sought by Strauss. In a famous passage in her judgment in Morgentaler, Wilson
J. contended that “the basic theory underlying the Charter” is that “… the state
will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible,
will avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good
life.”156 Mill’s pursuit of “our own good in our own good way,” often quoted by
the Court,157 nicely supports this view of the Charter. Sauvé stands as an
exemplar of this choice, with the Chief Justice characterizing the Charter as
charging “courts with upholding and maintaining an inclusive, participatory
democratic framework within which citizens can explore and pursue different
conceptions of the good.”158 Mill is the philosopher who minimizes the
restraints on choice, whether it be by the individual in the pursuit of personal
happiness, or by the Court in its fashioning of public policy. Maybe that is why
he tops the judicial popularity poll for political philosophers.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In one sense, the Sauvé decision marks an end to the “dialogue” between
Parliament and the Court on the issue of the prisoner franchise. Prisoners in
federal penitentiaries now may vote in federal elections and, as a result of the
154

Supra, note 150, at para. 101.
For a critique of this view of morality as public consensus see Del Bigio, “Denying the
Right to Vote: A Decision of Political Philosophy or Constitutional Principle?” (2002) 15 C. of R.
Newsletter, No. 6, at 2.
156
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 229.
157
R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at para. 74; R. v. Mortgentaler, supra, note 156, at para.
231; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, supra, note 143, at para. 74; Reference Re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, supra, note 143, at para. 50. While the Court
invariably only quotes part of Mill’s famous dictum, the full quotation reads: “The only freedom
which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.” Mills, On Liberty, Great
Books of the World (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1994), at 273.
158
Supra, note 150, at para. 15.
155
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Canada Election Act’s link between voter eligibility and qualification for
office, prisoners may run as candidates in federal elections. Given the virtually
absolute status accorded by the majority to the right to vote, it is difficult to see
how any new legislative restriction on the prisoner franchise could survive
scrutiny.
In another sense Sauvé signals the need to begin a new dialogue about
Charter interpretation, a dialogue within the Court, between the Court and
Parliament, and between the Court and the larger political community. Sauvé
points to three areas needing a fresh approach to Charter interpretation. First,
sections of the Charter guaranteeing rights and freedoms need to be interpreted
in their entirety. By interpreting only part of a section at a time, a court risks
losing sight of the interplay and interdependence of the various interests
protected by the right or freedom. Second, the vigorous disagreement within the
Court about the application of the Oakes test perhaps indicates that it is time to
fundamentally rethink the proper approach to section 1. Oakes may have
outlived its usefulness; its many layers and glosses have taken the courts far
from the original language and principles of section 1. It is time to look anew at
the language of section 1. Finally, the differences within the Court regarding
the appropriateness of passing any moral judgment on those who have broken
the criminal law reflects a deeper problem with the state of contemporary
Charter analysis. Most Charter commentary paints a battle between individual
rights and state restrictions; missing is any fulsome discussion of individual
responsibilities or obligations that are the corollary of rights. While “citizen
law-breakers” may fit nicely with a feelings-based concept of human dignity,
encouraging “citizen law-keepers” must remain a primary goal of Canadian
law.
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APPENDIX “A”
SUMMARY OF THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES ADVANCED IN
PRISONER VOTING CASES
Case name
Administrative and
To affirm and
To preserve the
To sanction
security reasons
maintain the
integrity of the
offenders
sanctity of the
voting process
franchise in our
democracy
Re Reynolds and
Attorney-General of
British Columbia
?
?
?
?
(1982), 143 D.L.R.
(3d) 365 (B.C.S.C.)
Re Reynolds and
Attorney-General of
British Columbia
(1984), 11 D.L.R.
(4th) 380

?

?

?

()

Re Jolivet and Barker
and The Queen and
Solicitor-General of
Canada (1983), 1
D.L.R. (4th) 604
(B.C.S.C.)



X



?

Gould v. Canada
(Attorney General),
[1984] 1 F.C. 1119
(T.D.)

X

?

X

?

Gould v. Canada
(Attorney General),
[1984] 1 F.C. 1133
(C.A.)

?

?

?

?

Levesque v. Canada
(Attorney-General)
(1985), [1986] 2 F.C.
287 (T.D.)

X

?

?

?

Badger v. Manitoba
(Attorney General)
(1986), 30 D.L.R. 108
(Man. Q.B.)

?

X

?

?

Administrative and
security reasons

To affirm and
maintain the
sanctity of the

To preserve the
integrity of the
voting process

To sanction
offenders

Case name

? =
X =
 =
() =

Not clear from judgment if advanced as an objective.
Rejected as a justification/reasonable limit by the majority.
Accepted as a justification/reasonable limit by the majority.
Accepted as a justification/reasonable limit in a dissent.
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franchise in our
democracy
Badger v. Manitoba
(Attorney General)
(1986), 32 D.L.R. 310
(Man. C.A.)

?

?

?

?

Grondin v. Ontario
(Attorney General)
(1988), 65 O.R. (2d)
427 (H.C.)

?

X

?

?

Badger v. Canada
(Attorney General)
(1988), 55 D.L.R.
(4th) 177 (Man. C.A.)

?



?

?

Belczowski v. Canada,
[1991] 3 F.C. 151
(T.D.)

Specifically not
advanced by the
Crown

X

X

X

Belczowski v. Canada,
[1992] 2 F.C. 440
(C.A.)

Specifically not
advanced by the
Crown

X

X

X

Sauvé v. Canada
(Attorney General)
(1988), 66 O.R. (2d)
234 (H.C.J.)

X



?

X

Sauvé v. Canada
(Attorney General)
(1992), 7 O.R. (3d)
481 (C.A.)

?

X

X

X

Sauvé v. Canada
(Attorney General),
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 438

?

?

?

?
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APPENDIX “B”
The Use of Political and Legal Philosophers by the Supreme Court of
Canada159
Name

Cases referring to
philosopher

Cases actually
quoting
philosopher

Political philosopher
1.

John Stuart Mill

14

13

2.

Aristotle

9

7

3.

Plato

3

1

4.

Alexis de Tocqueville

2

2

5.

Jeremy Bentham

2

2

6.

G.W.F. Hegel

2

0

7.

Immanuel Kant

2

0

8.

John Milton

2

1

9.

Robert George

1

1

10.

Alexander Hamilton

1

1

11.

Thomas Jefferson

1

0

12.

John Rawls

1

1

13.

Joseph Raz

2

2

14.

Voltaire

1

1

Legal Theorist
15.

William Blackstone

16

16

16.

Ronald Dworkin

8

5

17.

Oliver Wendell Holmes

4

4

18.

H.L.A. Hart

3

1

159

The search was conducted of the Quicklaw database “Supreme Court Judgments” on all
decisions involving Charter issues since 1985. This table does not purport to represent an exact
compilation of all references, but only serves as an approximation.
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Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, at 251.
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at para. 294.
Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, at 241.
R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, at paras. 193 and 196.
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Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
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